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INTRODUCTION

Over the last several years, Florida and other states have made great
strides toward improving the availability and quality of health care
* Associate, Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Marks, Bryant & Yon, P.A., Tallahassee,
Florida. J.D. with High Honors, 1993, Florida State University; B.S., 198 1, Emory University.
*4
Associate, Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Marks, Bryant & Yon, P.A., Tallahassee,
Florida. J.D. with High Honors, 1995, Florida State University; B.J., 1990, University of
Nebraska-Lincoln.
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coverage for their citizens. Many of these improvements result from
an increased use of managed care health plans, including health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and preferred provider organizations
(PPOs).l Health maintenance organizations are beginning to occupy a

greater share of the health insurance market,' and studies indicate that
the enrollment growth in these managed care plans is a primary factor
in the rate of decline in the spiraling costs of health care coverage.'
Some interest groups, however, have promoted legislation that
would heavily burden managed care plans by eliminating some of the
essential concepts upon which managed care is based.4 Proponents of
this anti-managed care legislation, including some physicians, claim
that HMOs place "profits ahead of patients," 5 alleging that HMOs
have achieved their cost savings at the expense of the quality of care
provided to enrollees. 6 Much of this proposed legislation is promoted
on the basis that it would protect patients and increase the quality of
care they receive.7 Managed care supporters, however, contend that
this proposed legislation actually is designed to help doctors rather
than their patients and would only drive up health care costs.8 This
battle over managed care was waged in legislatures across the country

1. "Managed care" is a broad term used to describe a variety of health plans which integrate the financing and delivery of health care services. Health maintenance organizations and
PPOs are common managed care organizations. "Managed care organizations will generally use
a variety of techniques such as utilization review, quality assurance programs, and preadmission
certification to better manage the care that is delivered, with the goal of controlling utilization
and cost, while still delivering quality care." FLA. H.R. CoMM. oN HEALTH CARE, HEALTH CARE
HANDOOK 30-31 (1995).
2. In a survey of more than 250 of Florida's largest public and private sector employers
representing more than 900,000 employees, 48% of these employers reported employees choosing managed care rather than indemnity coverage in the past year. Survey participants reported
that plan configurations reflected a continuing shift toward managed care. Use of HMO plans
increased from 5% in 1993 to 4507o in 1994. WILLIAM M. MERCER, INc., 1994 FLORIDA HEALTH
CARE COSTS AND BENEFITS: SuRWva RESULTS 2, 4, 6 (Sixth Annual Issue 1994). Nationally, current enrollment in HMOs is nearly 50 million, up from 3.6 million in 1973. Jerry Geisel, HMOs
Ready To Give Up an Old Crutch, BUs. INS., Dec. 20, 1994, at 6, 6.
3. For example, the results of the Mercer survey indicate that the switch to managed care
has produced cost reductions. Of those organizations where employee enrollment in managed
care is now greater than enrollment in an indemnity plan, 800 reported that switching to managed care has helped reduce increases in health care coverage costs. WILLIAM M. MERCER, INC.,
supranote 2, at 4-6; see generally Geisel, supra note 2 (reporting that the rise in health care costs
continued to be low in 1995).
4. See infra notes 29-94 and accompanying text.
5. Craig S.Palosky, Doctors Want Surgery on HMOs, TAMPA Tarn., Mar. 27, 1995, Nation/World Section, at 1.
6. Id.
7. See Palosky, supra note 5, at 5; see also infra notes 29-94 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., infra notes 29-94 and accompanying text.
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during 1995 and is likely to continue at both the state and federal
levels. 9
The first part of this Article discusses managed care legislation.
Specifically, it provides a summary of some of the last five years of
Florida's legislative health care advancements incorporating managed
care concepts. It then discusses some of the proposed legislation which
targets HMOs and other managed care plans. The second part of the
Article presents a comprehensive analysis of medical literature comparing the quality of care provided by HMOs to the quality of care
provided to patients with traditional fee-for-service insurance. 0 The
available literature indicates that the quality of care provided by
HMOs is as good as, if not better than, the quality of care provided in
a traditional fee-for-service setting." Finally, the Article concludes
that, because studies show that the quality of care in HMOs is as good
as the care provided under traditional insurance coverage, legislation
which would cripple managed care in the name of preserving quality is
unnecessary and counterproductive.
II.
A.

FLORIDA LEGISLATION

Legislative Advances in the Provision of Low-Cost Health Care

During the 1980s and early 1990s, the spiraling costs of health care
threatened to bankrupt the country. In Florida alone, health care expenditures increased 278% between 1980 and 1991.12 The state's total
health care bill was $35 billion in 1991 and $38 billion in 1992. 13 Without a major change in Florida's health care system, some estimated
that Florida's total health care bill would reach $90 billion by the year
2000.'4 Nationally, as recently as the late 1980s, costs of group health
care plans were increasing at more than 15% annually." As a result of

9. See George Anders & Laura Johannes, Doctors Are Losing a Lobbying Battle to
HMOs, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1995, at BI, B2.
10. In a traditional fee-for-service health insurance setting the insured chooses the provider
for his or her treatment, regardless of the appropriateness of the particular doctor's credentials
or specialty (if any). There are few or no economic incentives for the provision of treatment in
an efficient, cost-effective manner. See Alphabet Soup, Tssss UNION (JAcKsoNvIL), Sept. 25,
1995, First Business, at 10. Generally, in a fee-for-service setting, providers are reimbursed based
on the amount and type of care given. The more services utilized, the more the provider is
reimbursed.
11. See infra notes 101-171 and accompanying text.
12. HEALTHY HoMEs 1994, THE FLORIDA Ha.TH SECuRIy PLAN 9 (Dec. 1993).
13. Id.
14. See id. at 10.
15. Jerry Geisel, Health Market Changes Spur 1% Drop in Costs, Bus. INs., Feb. 13, 1995,
at i, 10.
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these increasing health care costs, more people were forced to forego
6
health insurance.1
In response, many states have enacted, or are enacting, legislation
designed to make quality health care available to their citizens at an
affordable price.' 7 In 1992, Florida increased its efforts to combat
these ills by enacting a series of reforms designed to make health care
less costly. The Florida Health Care Reform Act of 1992 contained
provisions creating the Employee Health Care Access Act, which initiated reforms in the small group health insurance market; 8 the Florida
Health Plan, which developed strategies and implemented goals relating to access, cost containment, health care regulation, and insurance
reforms;' 9 and the Agency for Health Care Administration, which
streamlined the regulation of health care in Florida. 20
In the following year, the Florida Legislature enacted the Health
Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993.21 Among other provisions,
this Act implemented the concept of "managed competition" in Florida through the creation of eleven Community Health Purchasing Alliances (CHPAs). 22 Under managed competition, providers and payers
join together to offer health care and insurance in a single package;
together they compete for customers in a geographically defined
health care market. 3 This Act also implemented health care coverage
reforms for Florida employers with fewer than fifty-one employees. 2 4
These reforms include modified community rating, guarantee-issue requirements, and portability.2 5
The Florida Legislature has continued to consider reforms. In 1994
and 1995, the Florida Legislature considered various versions of the
Florida Health Security Act. 26 These Acts would have enrolled Medicaid participants in managed care plans and would have used the savings to assist low-income Floridians in purchasing health care

16.

HEALTHY HoMEs

17.

See

ANNE

R.

1994, supra note 12, at 7-8.

MARKUS ET AL., SPECIAL REPORT: SMALL GROUP MARKET REFORMS: A

SNAPSHOT OF STATES' EXPERIENCE 1 (Feb. 1995).

18. 1992, Fla. Laws ch. 92-233, § 117, at 328 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.6699 (1995)).
19. Id. §§ 5-7, at 244 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 408.004-.006 (1995)).
20. Id. § 1, at 241 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.42 (1995)).
21. 1993, Fla. Laws ch. 93-129; see also Bruce D. Platt, A Summary of the Health Care and
Insurance Reform Act of 1993: Florida Blazes the Trail, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 483, 483 (1993).
22. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care, CS for SB 1914, SB 2006, SB 1784, SB 406 (1993)
Staff Analysis I (final May 11, 1993) (on file with comm.).
23.

See HEALTH LAW SERIES, HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 51 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1994).

24. Id. at 52.
25. Id.; see also 1993, Fla. Laws ch. 93-128 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.6699 (1995)); see
also Platt, supra note 21, at 495.
26.

Fla. HB 1459 (1995); Fla. HB 2823 (1994).

1995]

ANTI-MANA GED CARE LEGISLATION

pass in the Legislature and are still
coverage.7 These proposals did not
28
the subject of rancorous debate.
B. Anti-Managed CareLegislation
Legislation also has been introduced in the Florida Legislature to
limit severely the effectiveness of managed care plans in general, and
HMOs in particular. During the 1995 session, legislation that targeted
managed care plans included the Patient Protection Act,2 9 the "Any
Willing Provider" measure, 3° and legislation mandating direct access
for patients to certain medical providers." None of these bills passed
the Legislature. 2 However, supporters indicate they will continue to
fight for passage of these measures in the future.33 A brief overview of
some of the key provisions contained in this proposed legislation follows.
1.

The PatientProtectionAct

During 1995, more than twenty state legislatures considered bills designed to hinder managed care organizations.3 4 Many of these bills
were patterned after the American Medical Association's Model Patient Protection Act, which was drafted in 1994.11 The provisions contained in Florida's version of the Patient Protection Act, House Bill
841 (the Act),3 6 are representative of nationwide proposals attempting
to restrict managed care and give more power to physicians and patients .7

a. PatientInformation
The Act would have required managed care plans to provide prospective enrollees with detailed information on the plan's terms,
27.
28.

Id.
FLA. LEcss., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION,

1995 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF

BILLS at 302, HB 1459; FLA. LEGS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1994 REGULAR
SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 392, HB 2823; see Diane Hirth, Health Reform Looks
'Deader Than Dead,' ORLANoo SENT., May 5, 1995, at B5.
29. Fla. HB 841 (1995).
30. Fla. HB 541 (1995).
31. Fla. HB 723 (1995).
32. FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1995 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
HOUSE BILLS at 267, HB 841; id. at 244, HB 541; id. at 257, HB 723.
33. See Anders & Johannes, supra note 9, at B1.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Fla. HB 841 (1995); see also Fla. SB 1986 (1995).
37. Id.
HOUSE
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conditions, and contracts with its providers." Supporters of this provision contend that it would have put patients, rather than insurance
companies, in control of care by providing them with additional information to enable them to make more informed choices when purchasing a health plan. 3 9
Health maintenance organization proponents contend that the most
useful information to the consumer is already presented to HMO enrollees with their member handbook 4° and that the Act could have required HMOs to provide volumes of material which would overwhelm
potential enrollees. 4' For example, the Act might have been interpreted to require detailed lists of coverage provisions, benefits, and
exclusions for each physician or provider in an HMO's network.4 2 For
large HMOs with many physicians and provider contracts, this provision alone would have required hundreds of pages. 43 The increased
expense of furnishing this information to consumers would not have
been matched by any additional value to the enrollee."4
Health maintenance organization representatives also are concerned
that this provision would have been interpreted to require them to
make available confidential information about the terms of their contracts with their hospitals and doctors.4 5 Health maintenance organization representatives contend that much of this information is of little
use to patients but could be used by competitors and adverse parties in

38. Fla. HB 841, § 100 (1995). The Act would have required HMOs and other managed
care plans to inform prospective enrollees of a plan's coverage provisions and exclusions, treatment policies and any restrictions or limitations on services, prior authorization or review requirements, any financial arrangements or contracts a plan has with hospitals, physicians or
other providers that would limit services, referral or treatment, including any financial incentives
not to provide services, an explanation of how plan limits would impact enrollees, loss ratios,
and enrollee satisfaction with a plan, including statistics on re-enrollment and enrollees' reasons
for leaving a plan. Id.
39. See, e.g., Letter from William E. Coletti, Exec. Dir., Pinellas County Medical Soc'y,
Inc., to the Editor, ST. PETE. Timas, June 17, 1994, at A17.
40. A plan's member handbook is the document distributed to the enrollee explaining what
services are available and how to access those services. All such handbooks are reviewed by the
Florida Department of Insurance to ensure that HMOs make the required information available.
See FLA STAT. § 641.21(1)(f) (1995).
41. Interview with Ralph F. Scott, Ass't Gen. Counsel, State Affairs, Health Ins. Ass'n of
Am., in Tallahassee, Fla. (Sept. 20, 1995).
42. See Fla. HB 841, § 100(5)(b)l (1995).
43. The authors understand that HMOs contract with many physicians to form the HMO's
network. To list each service each physician could perform and each service each physician could
not perform, would necessarily lead to hundreds of pages.
44. At a minimum these expenses would have included the cost of preparing the reports, the
material needed for the reports, and the cost of storage.
45. See Fla. HB 841, § 100(5)(b)4 (1995); see also Interview with Ralph F. Scott, supra note
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contract negotiations." These representatives argue that this information is proprietary and that making some of this information public
would necessarily hinder future negotiations with providers; providing
such information, which has no bearing on the quality of care, would
47
thus increase the cost of providing care.
b.

PhysicianDue Process

The Act would have provided increased due process rights to physicians who were denied admittance to or terminated from a managed
care plan. 41 It would have required each plan to establish a credentialing system for physicians49 and would have allowed all physicians
within a plan's geographic area to apply for the plan's credentials .1
The Act also would have required HMOs to hire or contract with all
qualified doctors who applied for credentials, even if the HMO had a
surplus of doctors in relation to its number of patients. 5 These provisions of the Act would have placed severe restrictions on an HMO's
52
ability to select its own physicians.
Managed care opponents contend that this provision would have
protected patients by removing the threat that an HMO could terminate a physician for economic reasons, or for having provided a patient with necessary care not authorized by the HMO. 53 This provision
46. For example, the Act would have required the HMO to disclose every specific medical
exclusion, including the names of every drug not included in the HMO's formularies. See Fla.
HB 841, § 100(5)(b)2 (1995). Such a list could consume many volumes and would be cumbersome and costly to publish. Moreover, pharmacies and drug manufacturers would find this information extremely valuable in their negotiations with HMOs. A patient or potential subscriber
who needs this information can obtain it by calling the HMO. Interview with Ralph F. Scott,
supranote 41.
47. Interview with Ralph F. Scott, supra note 41.
48. Fla. HB 841, § 100(5)(d)9 (1995).
49. Id. at § 100(5)(d).
50. Id. The Act would have further provided that if economic considerations were a factor
in the decision to grant or deny credentials, any economic profiling of a physician would have to
take into account features of the physician's practice which could account for costs which are
higher or lower than expected, such as case mix and age of patients. Id. Decisions regarding
granting or denying an application would have been required to be on the record. Id.
51. The effect of this legislation would be virtually the same as that of the proposed "Any
Willing Provider" legislation. See discussion infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
52. See id. A plan could not have denied, reduced, or withdrawn credentials without providing the physician notice, an opportunity for a hearing before an arbitrator or hearing officer,
and an opportunity to complete a "corrective action plan." Id. These due process requirements
could only have been denied in cases where "imminent harm to patient health" existed, or where
the physician was unable to practice medicine due to action by the Board of Medicine or another
government agency. Id. A physician would have had the right to appeal the decision of the
arbitrator or hearing officer. Id.
53. Your Right To Select Your Doctor and Hospital-PatientFreedom of Choice, MED.
HEALTH CARE ALLIANCE (on file with authors); see generally Legislature: Protect Patients, Act
To Curb Growing HMO Power, TALL. Die., Feb. 15, 1995, at A8.
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would have given physicians statutory job security not provided to
any other profession. 4 Supporters of managed care view the measure
as a virtual guarantee that every physician in Florida would have had
an unprecedented right to obtain and keep a job.5
Furthermore, HMOs argued that they would have been prevented
from quickly terminating doctors who were making mistakes.5 6 Under
the Act, an HMO could not have removed a doctor from its network
unless the HMO had been able to prove the physician had caused
"imminent harm to patient health[,J or [there had been] an action by
the Board of Medicine or other government agency that effectively
[impaired] the physician's ability to practice medicine within the jurisdiction," even if the HMO believed that the physician was not providing a suitable level of care.57 Such a measure, HMO proponents
contend, actually would have provided physicians with more protection than their patients.5"
Health maintenance organization supporters also note that an
HMO needs the ability to determine the number of physicians in its
network.5 9 One of the bedrock principles of managed care is that
HMOs negotiate discounts with physicians in exchange for a certain
patient volume. 60 Requiring an HMO to accept and retain all physicians who meet the credential requirements would eliminate an
HMO's ability to provide its physicians with this volume. Thus, HMO
supporters argue that the measure would have eliminated a provider's
economic incentive to accept a lower rate and would have undermined
one of the basic concepts of managed care. 61
c.

Treatment Decisions

Supporters of the Act allege that HMO administrators, rather than
the physicians, make the decisions regarding treatment of patients.6 2

54.

See DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, 384 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 1980). As an "at-

will" employment state, Florida employers are not generally required to furnish specific reasons
for firing employees.
55. See generally Martin Dyckman, Self-Serving Doctors, ST. PETE. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1995,
at A19.
56. Id.
57. Fla. HB 841, § 100 (1995); see also infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
58. See generally Dyckman, supra note 55, at A19; see also BLUE CRoss BLUE SHILD OF
FLORIDA, PATIENT PROTECTION ACT POLICY STATEMENT (1995) (on file with authors).

59. See Telephone Interview with Richard F. Dorf, Exec. Dir. of Fla. Ass'n of HMOs
(Sept. 20, 1995); Interview with Ralph F. Scott, supra note 41.
60. See e.g. John Dunbar, HMOs FightPatient Choice, TIMs UNION (JACKSONVILLE), Apr.
25, 1995, at Al, A4.
61. Id.
62. The American Medical Association has emphasized this concern in its advertising

1995]

ANTI-MANA GED CARE LEGISLATION

They believe that HMO employees may not always have the best interest of the patient in mind. Under the Act, only physicians would have
been allowed to recommend denial of coverage or services or to make
decisions about the necessity or appropriateness of treatment. 63 Any
claimant who had a claim denied as "not medically necessary" would
have been entitled to a due process appeal."
Health maintenance organization proponents argue that this provision of the Act could have been interpreted to apply to two separate
issues: treatment denial decisions and coverage decisions. 6 They note
that HMOs already are required to have treatment denial decisions
reviewed by a physician. However, they are concerned that the Act
would have been interpreted to apply to decisions concerning whether
the treatment is covered under the HMOs' health plans as well. 67 This
might have resulted in a requirement that all claims adjusters be licensed physicians.6e
Health maintenance organization supporters further argue that this
provision was unnecessary because all HMOs already are required to
have grievance procedures through which HMO enrollees can challenge denial of authorization, and these grievance procedures provide
a thorough review of all contested actions.6 9 Under current law, these

campaign promoting its anti-managed care proposals. One such ad warned, "Would you rather
trust your life to an MD or an MBA?" See John Fairhall, Clash of the Titans: Doctors, HMOs,
Insurers on Health Care, BALTIMORE SUN, July 3, 1994, at El. Much of the rhetoric surrounding
the AMA's model of this provision depicts managed care plans as placing medical decision making "in the hand of corporate clerks and government bureaucrats." Steven Brostoff, AMA
Backing "Anti-HMO" Legislation, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, LwE & HEarTH INS., May 30, 1994, at
1. "If we don't keep the health plans honest," the AMA warns, "some anonymous clerk sitting
at the end of a 1-800 number is going to take over for your doctor." Adrianne Appel, AMA
Tries Pressure on HMOs: Ad Campaign Seeks Support for Legislation That Would Require
More Health-Plan Information, PEORIA J. STAR, May 29, 1994, at C15 (quoting Dr. Lonnie
Bristow, Chairperson of the AMA Board).
63. Fla. H.B. 841, § 100(1995).
64. Id.
65. Interview with Ralph F. Scott, supra note 41; Telephone Interview with Richard F.
Dorf, supra note 59.
66. HMO accreditation agencies require that these review decisions be made by a physician.
Standardsfor the Accreditation of Managed Care Associations, in NCQA MANUAL 1995 EDITION 25, 25 (1995) (on file with authors). Currently, Florida law requires all HMOs to be accredited within one year of obtaining their certificate of authority to operate. FLA. STAT. § 641.512
(1995).
67. Interview with Ralph F. Scott, supra note 41; Telephone Interview with Richard F.
Dorf, supra note 59.
68. See Telephone Interview with Richard F. Dorf, supra note 59.
69. See FLA. STAT. § 641.511 (1995); see also NCQA MANUAL, supra note 66, at 33-34; Phil
Galewitz, As HMOs Proliferate, So Do Complaints About Them, PALM Bcs. POsT, Oct. 15,
1995, at E4 (interview with Linda Enfinger of AHCA explaining the grievance process).
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grievance procedures must be approved by the state 70 and meet national accreditation standards. 7' If the enrollee is not satisfied with the

outcome of the HMO's grievance procedure, an independent statewide subscriber assistance program is available to review the denial. 72
This actually provides more safeguards for HMO enrollees, as such a
statewide review of decisions is not always available for traditional
indemnity policyholders. 73
d.

Antitrust Exemption

The Act would have granted physicians an exemption from antitrust
laws in order to "combine into sufficiently large networks" to negotiate and compete with managed care plans .74 The American Medical

Association depicts the antitrust exemption as a way for physicians to
"even the playing field" with insurers and HMOs. 75 However, insurers maintain that an antitrust exemption would cause boycotts and
price-fixing by physicians. 76 They contend that this would be anticompetitive and result in increased health care costs. 77 Health maintenance organization proponents note that similar antitrust protections
are not available for any other industry or employer group, and they
78
question why only medical providers should obtain such protections.
In addition, the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Department of Justice already have developed health care provider antitrust
"safety zones. ' 79 Health maintenance organization proponents

70. See FLA. STAT. §§ 641.495(8), 641.21(l)(e) (1995). The grievance procedure must be
contained in the HMO's contract offered for its subscribers. See id. § 641.495(8). The master
contract must be approved by the Department of Insurance. See id. §§ 641.21(l)(f), 641.31(3).
71. See id. §641.512.
72. See id. §641.511.
73. Interview with Ralph F. Scott, supra note 41; Telephone Interview with Richard F.
Dorf, supra note 59.
74. Fla. HB 841, § 17 (1995) (codified at Fla. Stat. § 408.7054 (1995)). The Act stated that
creation of "health care provider networks" would "enhance competition" by allowing independent health care providers and small group practices to participate in the market alongside
the large corporate networks. Id. The Act intended to exempt these networks of independent
physicians from state antitrust laws and to provide immunity from federal antitrust laws so that
they could engage in collective activity with respect to disseminating information on cost and
pricing data, payment procedures, patient referral protocols, administrative matters, and dispute
resolution mechanisms. Id.
75. See, e.g., Fairhall, supra note 62, at El.
76. Id.
77. See generally FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF HEALTH MANTEANSCE OROANZATIONS ANTITRUST POLICY STATEMENT (1995) (on file with authors).

78. Telephone Interview with Richard F. Dorf, supra note 59; see also Palosky, supra note
5,at 5 (quoting Carl Homer speaking generally about the Patient Protection Act).
79. In 1993 the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (together, the
"Agencies") set forth six policy statements regarding the enforcement of antitrust policies
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contend that these safety zones should be given an opportunity to
work and that the necessity of an antitrust exemption should be independently examined before carving out such exemptions for specific
groups .8
2.

Freedom of Choice/Any Willing Provider

One of the most controversial pieces of legislation directed at managed care would have required an HMO to allow any physician to
become a service provider for the HMO so long as the physician
agreed to accept the HMO's reimbursement rates and to comply with
the HMO's guidelines. 8' Referred to as the "Any Willing Provider"
measure, House Bill 541 reciprocally provided that enrollees in HMOs
would be entitled at all times to "absolute choice" in the selection of
their providers.8 2 Health maintenance organizations would be "expressly forbidden" from requiring or coercing enrollees to use any
provider other than one the enrollee selected.83
"Any Willing Provider" legislation defeats the entire concept of
managed care. Health maintenance organizations and other managed
care entities currently contract with only the number of physicians
needed to serve their patients. By offering physicians an increased patient volume and a set income, HMOs are able to negotiate lower
rates u Requiring HMOs to allow any qualified physician to join the
plan would drive up operating costs and reduce the HMO's bargaining
power to negotiate physician fees. Cost savings generated by HMOs
would be lost, and higher premiums would result.81

relating to the health care industries. In 1994, these were revised and new policy statements were

added. The statements describe certain health care antitrust "safety zones," which are circumstances under which the Agencies will not challenge conduct under the antitrust laws. These
"safety zones" are: I) "Mergers Among Hospitals," II) "Hospital Joint Ventures Involving
High Technology or Other Expensive Health Care Equipment," III) "Hospital Joint Ventures
Involving Specialized Clinical or Other Expensive Health Care Services," IV) "Providers' Collective Provision of Non-Fee-Related Information to Purchasers of Health Care Services," V)
"Providers' Collective Provision of Fee-Related Information to Purchasers of Health Care Services," VI) "Provider Participation in Exchanges of Price and Cost Information," VII) "Joint
Purchasing Arrangements Among Health Care Providers," VIII) "Physician Network Joint
Ventures," and IX) "Analytical Principles Relating to Multiprovider Networks." See generally
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND THE FTC, STATEMENTS OF ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND ANALYTICAL
PRINCn'LEs RELATING TO HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST (Sept. 27, 1994).
80. See generally GROUP HEALTH POLICY, PRUDENTIAL ANTITRUST POLICY STATEMENT &
PRUDENTIAL ANTI-MANAGED CARE LAWS POLICY STATEMENT (Mar. 1995).

81. Fla. HB 541, § 1 (1995).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84.
85.

See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield estimated that premiums would increase by as much as 140
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, "Any Willing Provider"
legislation could cripple the HMO's ability to ensure the quality of
care provided by the physicians in its networks. While only minimal
oversight is required in a traditional fee-for-service setting, HMOs are
required to evaluate physicians' credentials before they are able to
join the network and are required continually to monitor the quality
of care provided once the physicians are members.8 6 Health maintenance organization proponents argue that requiring HMOs to accept
providers and making it difficult to terminate them from the HMO
network will necessarily an hinder HMOs' ability to ensure high-qual7
ity health care.
3.

DirectAccess

Another buzzword in the battle over managed care is "direct access." "Direct access" allows patients to receive services from certain
health care providers without prior approval from their primary care
physician. 88 Currently, HMOs operate under a "gatekeeper system,"
whereby the primary care physician, the "gatekeeper," usually must
refer patients to a specialist before the HMO will cover the cost of the
specialist's services 89 The gatekeeper system assures that unnecessary
services are avoided and that high-cost services are not overutilized by
making one physician responsible for the coordination of the subscriber's treatment, medications, and other health care needs. 9° Health
maintenance organization proponents argue that the gatekeeper's
knowledge about the patient's medical history puts the gatekeeper in
the best position to determine the most appropriate and cost-efficient
care. 91
if "Any Willing Provider" legislation passed. Dunbar, supra note 60, at Al. In its fiscal
evaluation of Florida's proposed "Any Willing Provider" legislation, Arthur Anderson and Associates concluded that the economic impact of this provision would be significant. See Fla.
H.R. Comm. on Health Care, HB 541 (1995) Staff Analysis 5 (Feb. 27, 1995) (on file with
comm.). The fiscal evaluation also predicted that administrative expenses would increase due to
greater network size. Id.
86. See FLA. STAT. § 641.512(4) (1995); see also NCQA M, suAL, supra note 66, at 27-31.
87.

See FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS,

ANY WILLING

PROVIDER POLICY STATEMENT 2 (1995) (on file with authors); see also BLUE CRoss BLUE SHIELD
OF FLORIDA, supra note 58.

88.

See Dunbar, supra note 60, at A4.

89. See, e.g., CAPrrAL HEALTH PLAN MEMBER HANDBOOK 4 (Mar. 1992) (on file with authors); see also Susan J. Stayn, Securing Access to HMOs, 94 Cottua. L. REV. 1674, 1679-80
(1994); see also FLA STAT. § 641.21(1)(f) (1995).
90. See Stayn, supra note 89, at 1679-82; see also FLORIDA DEfT. OF INs., 1994, 1995
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION CONsuMERS' GutDE 1-2 (1994).
91.

See generally FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS, DIRECT

AccEss POLICY STATEMENT (1995) (on file with authors).
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House Bill 72392 would have allowed HMO subscribers direct access
to board-certified optometrists, ophthalmologists, and dermatologists
under contract with the HMO. 93 The bill also would have prohibited
HMOs from establishing disincentives to inhibit subscribers from
seeking direct access to these three types of providers.4 Allowing the
patient direct access could have resulted in unnecessary utilization of
these providers by HMO enrollees; such utilization would have increased health care premiums without necessarily increasing the quality of care.
III.

Is SUBSTANTIAL REFORM REALLY NECESSARY? AN ANALYSIS OF
THE QUALITY OF CARE PROVIDED BY HMOs

Before legislation is passed which would, in many respects, eliminate managed care as a low-cost health care alternative, it is necessary
to examine objectively the performance of HMOs and the care they
provide. Supporters of the proposed curbs on managed care cite quality of care as one of the primary reasons such legislation is required.9 5
Sponsors of these bills have attempted to link the cost savings HMOs
generate to a decrease in the quality of the care provided to enrollees.96 As one Florida Representative stated, "[A]ny time you squeeze
price, squeeze price, squeeze price, quality is going to go down, go
down, go down."' 97 The Patient Protection Act itself cites that "potential and actual abuses by insurance companies and other managed
care organizations, including making inappropriate decisions to refuse
or terminate health care and other decisions which negatively affect
patients' health," are evidence of the need for tough reforms which
will protect patients from mistreatment."
Recent studies, however, demonstrate that HMOs across the country are providing care which is not only of high quality but is, in many
cases, better than the care provided to patients in non-managed care
plans. 99 These studies have reviewed the quality of care provided in

92.

Fla. HB 723 (1995).

93.

Id.

94. Id.
95. Palosky, supra note 5, at 5 (quoting Rep. Everett Kelly, D-Tavares); see also Dan Morgan, HMO Trend Squeezes Big-Fee Medical Specialists, WASH. POST, July 17, 1994, at Al.
96. Palosky, supra note 5, at 5 (providing an example of these attempts).
97. Id. (quoting Rep. Everett Kelly, D-Tavares).
98. Fla. HB841, § 100(1995).
99. This analysis examines several recent studies published in medical journals such as the
Journal of the American Medical Association, the New England Journalof Medicine, and the
Annals of Internal Medicine. In an attempt to limit subjective biases, the publications listed in
this analysis primarily concentrated on the difference in reported outcomes between HMOs and
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many settings and to many different types of patients.100 Thus, the
question arises whether there is a legitimate reason to pass legislation
which would substantially alter, if not destroy, the managed care system.
The following section of this Article will focus upon medical literature comparing the treatment provided by HMOs to the treatment
provided by traditional fee-for-service plans in the following areas:
preventive care and health promotion in general, early diagnosis of
diseases, care of the elderly, care of children, care in acute situations,
and efficiency in medical treatment. It also will address comparative
data relating to survival and mortality rates.
A.

Preventive Care and Health Promotion in General

There is general agreement that one of the most effective and affordable means of providing quality health care is to make available,
and encourage the use of, preventive care and health-promotion services. Research shows that HMOs are more effective at providing preventive care and health-promotion services than traditional fee-forservice indemnity plans. A recent literature analysis of managed care
performance since 1980 published in the Journal of the American
Medical Association cites six studies which have found that HMO
plan enrollees receive more preventive tests, procedures, examinations, and health-promotion services than indemnity plan enrollees. ' 0'
Among the six reviewed studies, one published in the Annals of Internal Medicine compared the quality of care provided to patients
with common ambulatory conditions in an HMO setting with care
provided in a traditional fee-for-service setting102 The authors found
that HMO patients were more likely to undergo screening for breast
cancer and cervical cancer and had better blood pressure control than
fee-for-service providers, as well as comparisons of the likelihood of receiving specific services
and diagnostic tests that are demonstrated to be indicators of quality health care. These studies
conclude that, in an examination of specific health outcomes measured, the quality of care provided to patients enrolled in HMOs is generally as good as, perhaps better than, the quality of
care received by patients enrolled in traditional fee-for-service insurance plans. This observation
is not new. A 1980 article reviewing 1958-1979 literature on the quality of health care in HMOs

concluded that the quality of care delivered by HMOs was generally better than, or comparable
to, fee-for-service care. See generally Frances C. Cunningham & John W. Williamson, How
Does the Quality of Health Care in HMOs Compare to that in Other Settings? An Analytic
Literature Review: 1958 to 1979, 1 GROUP HEALTH J. 4 (1980).

100.
101.

See infra notes 101-71 and accompanying text.
Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Performance Since 1980, 271

JAMA 1512, 1516 (1994).
102. 1. Steven Udvarhelyi et al., Comparison of the Quality of Ambulatory Care for Fee-for-

Service and Prepaid Patients, 115 ANNALs INTrE"As.
MED. 394, 394 (1991).
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fee-for-service patients.0 3 The study also found that HMO patients
were equally as likely to undergo screening for colon cancer as fee-forservice patients.'04 Interestingly, the authors' initial hypothesis was
that financial incentives to limit treatment in a network model HMO
would reduce the number of services provided to HMO patients and
potentially reduce the quality of care received. 10 5 However, they determined from their data that HMO patients "received equal or better
quality of care than fee-for-service patients treated by the same physicians" for the treatment of uncomplicated high blood pressure "and
for the provision of preventive services to middle-aged women without
chronic diseases."106 The authors concluded that "incentives for physicians to limit the use of medical services did not compromise the
quality of ambulatory care" received by HMO patients. 07
Researchers with the Centers for Disease Control and the National
Center for Health Statistics reached a similar conclusion in a cancer
screening study of women.118 In this study, female HMO enrollees
aged fifty to sixty-four were found to receive more mammographies,
clinical breast exams, and Pap tests than women with fee-for-service
coverage. 09 Using data from the 1992 National Health Survey, the authors of this study found that among women aged fifty to sixty-four
with twelve years of education or less, 62.8% of female HMO enrollees had received a mammogram within the year preceding this study,
compared with only 48.1% of women with fee-for-service coverage."'
Almost 710/o of the total HMO enrollees had recently received a clinical breast examination and nearly 63% had received a Pap test within
the past year.' In comparison, less than 64% of women with fee-forservice coverage had received a clinical breast exam in the past year,
and only 56% had received a Pap test in the past year." 2 For all
women aged sixty-five and older, use of mammography and Pap testing was approximately 13% higher for HMO enrollees than for
women with fee-for-service coverage." 3

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 397-98.
Id.
Id. at 398.
Id.
Id. at 399.
Diane M. Makuc et al., Health Insurance and Cancer Screening Among Women, in

ADvANCE DATA FROM VITAl AND HEALTH STATISTICS OF THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, NATIONA1 CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, No. 254 (Aug. 1994).

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 5.
ld. at4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
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As these representative studies indicate, HMO patients are more
likely to receive preventive care and screening than patients with feefor-service coverage.
B.

Early Diagnosis of Disease

For many diseases, the effectiveness and degree of treatment vary
depending upon the stage of the disease at the time of diagnosis. An
earlier diagnosis means easier and more successful treatment. Thus,
the quality and the cost of care are directly related to the extent of the
disease at the time of detection.
Recent research indicates that HMOs provide superior cancer
screening and preventive services than fee-for-service providers. For
example, a study published in the American Journal of Public Health
compared the stage of cancer diagnosis in Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in HMOs to the stage of cancer diagnosis in fee-for-service patients." 4 This study found that providers diagnosed HMO enrollees
with melanoma, female breast, cervix, and colon cancer at significantly earlier stages in the disease." 5 The largest differences were
found in women with cervical cancer and in patients with melanoma." 1 Health maintenance organizations diagnosed 58o0 of enrollees with cervical cancer at the "in situ," or local stage, as opposed to
regional or distant stages.1 7 Only 38.8% of fee-for-service patients
were diagnosed at this local stage."' In melanoma patients, 39% of
HMO enrollees were diagnosed when the cancer was at the local stage,
compared to only 23.8% of fee-for-service patients." 9
The research indicates that the earlier diagnosis of these cancers
may be attributable to HMO coverage of screening procedures such as
mammographies, Pap tests, fecal occult blood tests, and physical examinations. 20 However, in most cancers that lack these routine
screening procedures, the researchers still found no difference in the
stage of diagnosis between HMO and fee-for-service patients.'' These
cancers studied include prostate, rectum, buccal cavity and pharynx,

114.
Service
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Gerald F. Riley et al., Stage of Cancer at Diagnosis for Medicare HMO and Fee-forEnrollees, 84 AM. J. Pun. HA.TH 1598, 1600 (1994).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1600-01.
Id.
Id. at 1601.
Id. at 1602.
Id.
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bladder, uterus, kidney, and ovary.'2 Thus, the research indicates that
HMO providers diagnose cancers at a stage which is at least equal to,
and sometimes significantly earlier than, the stage of diagnosis for
fee-for-service patients.
C. Care of the Elderly
At least one critic of managed care has expressed concern that
HMOs may be insensitive to patients with special needs, such as the
elderly. 23 While it would seem that the supposed financial incentives
to limit treatment in HMOs would be especially strong among highcost enrollees such as the elderly, current research indicates otherwise. 24 A recent study published in the Annals of Internal Medicine
compared the health and functional status of elderly Medicaid recipients in prepaid plans to the status of elderly patients enrolled in
traditional fee-for-service Medicaid. 21 The authors of this study
found that elderly patients enrolled in prepaid plans reported better
general health and well-being scores than those enrolled in fee-forservice plans.126 The study reported no differences between the two
insurance groups as to number of deaths, the proportion in fair or
poor health, physical functioning, activities of daily living, visual acuity, blood pressure, or diabetic control. 27 The authors concluded that
"there was no evidence of harmful effects of enrolling elderly Medi' 2
caid patients in prepaid plans, at least in the short run."' 1
Another study found similar results when it compared the quality of
care received by elderly patients with high blood pressure in Medicare
HMOs to those in fee-for-service plans.' 29 Of 685 elderly hypertensive
patients studied, those enrolled in HMOs were more likely than those
in fee-for-service plans to have their medications, alcohol history, and
smoking history documented.1- These HMO patients were three times
122. Id. at 1601. An exception was found in patients with stomach cancer, where HMO
enrollment was associated with distant stage disease. Id.; see also Howard P. Greenwald &
Curtis J. Henke, HMO Membership, Treatment, and Mortality Risk Among Prostatic Cancer
Patients, 82 Am.J. Pua. HEALTH 1099, 1100 (1992) (finding that the stage at diagnosis of prostate cancer did not systematically vary among HMO and fee-for-service patients).
123. Nicole Lurie etal..
The Effects of Capitation on Health and Functional Status of the
Medicaid Elderly, 120 ANNALs INTERNAL MED. 506, 506 (1994).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.at 508.
127. Id.at 506.
128. Id.
129. Jeanette A. Preston & Sheldon M. Retchin, The Management of Geriatric Hypertension inHealth Maintenance Organizations, 39 J.Am.GEPumT ics Soc'Y 683, 683 (1991).
130. Id. at 686.
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more likely to have their orthostatic blood pressures checked both at
their initial visit and in follow-up visits.' 3' The authors also found
"significant differences" between the two settings in referrals to subspecialists.' 32 Medicare HMO patients were more likely to receive a
funduscopic examination and more likely to be referred to an ophthalmologist for examination.' Cardiac examinations were "consistently
more frequently evaluated" in the Medicare HMO patients than in the
34
fee-for-service patients.
Hypertensive patients enrolled in Medicare HMOs also were significantly more likely to undergo screenings of electrolytes and renal parameters and tests for diabetes mellitus, and they were more likely to
receive a chest roentgenogram.' 3 While this study found that the
Medicare HMO patients received fewer medication adjustments in response to new mental status changes and were less likely to have electrolytes monitored if they were on diuretics, 136 the authors concluded
that elderly hypertensive patients in Medicare HMOs received "equal
or better quality of care for most criteria," compared with those in
fee-for-service settings.'"
D.

Care of Children

Children comprise another segment of the population that is particularly vulnerable to inadequate care. 13 Research conducted in response to this concern demonstrates that children enrolled in HMOs
receive care which is at least comparable to the care received by children enrolled in fee-for-service plans. 3 9
In a study conducted in conjunction with the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, 693 children ranging in age from newborn to thirteen were randomly assigned to either a staff model HMO or to one
of several fee-for-service plans. 140 A comparison of the two groups
found no difference in total health expenditures or in individual

131.
132.

Id.
Id.

133.

Id.

134. Id.
135. Id.
136.

!d.at 689.

137. Id. at 683; see also Ron Winslow, Elderly Get Similar Quality At HMOs As At Traditional Settings, Study Says, WALL ST. J., May 18, 1994, at B4.
138. See R. Burciaga Valdez et al., Prepaid Group Practice Effects on the Utilization of
Medical Services and Health Outcomes for Children: Results From a Controlled Trial, 83 PEDIATRICS 168, 168 (1989).

139.
140.

Id. at 179.
Id. at 168. The cost sharing in the fee-for-service plans varied from 0% to 95 %. Id.
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health outcomes. 14' However, children assigned to an HMO had a
40% greater number of routine preventive examinations and had a
50% greater number of office visits than children assigned to a feefor-service plan. 42 The authors concluded that these results indicate
that "no serious negative health effects exist for children receiving
care in the staff model prepaid
group practice compared to those re' 43
ceiving fee-for-service care.'
E.

Care in Acute Situations

Additional concerns about HMO coverage may arise in acute care
settings; these concerns include accessibility of HMO enrollees to
medically necessary acute care and the quality of care HMO enrollees
receive in these acute situations. However, recent research shows
HMO enrollees actually may receive superior care in acute situations,
compared to patients with fee-for-service insurance.
A 1994 study published in the New England Journal of Medicine

found that patients with acute appendicitis who had fee-for-service
coverage were more likely to suffer a ruptured appendix, which is associated with elevated mortality, than those patients enrolled in HMO
plans.' " The researchers suggested that "insurance-related delays in
seeking medical care' '1 45 might be responsible; they noted that
"[d]eductibles and higher co-payments in fee-for-service plans may
contribute to delays by patients in seeking care."'' Furthermore, they
commented that "large staff-model HMOs often provide urgent care
facilities that are separate from the hospital emergency room; such
facilities may increase the likelihood of an early evaluation for ab47
dominal pain."
Additional research demonstrates that HMO members are actually
more likely than fee-for-service patients to be admitted to a hospital in
some acute situations. 4 A 1994 study of 3,006 patients who sought
treatment at a hospital emergency department for acute chest pain
found that HMO patients were more likely to be admitted to the

141. Id.
142. Id. at 175 (comparing children assigned to an HMO with children assigned to a co-pay
fee-for-service plan).
143. Id.at 179.

144. Paula Braveman et al., Insurance-Related Differences inthe Risk of Ruptured Appendix, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 444, 446 (1994).
145.
146.

Id.at 447.
Id.at 448.

147. Id.
148. Steven D. Pearson et al., The Impact of Membership ina Health Maintenance Organization on Hospital Admission Rates for Acute Chest Pain, 29 HEAL.TH SERVS. Ras. 59, 59 (1994).
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hospital than patients in other insurance groups. 49 These results were
true for patients at low risk and medium risk of acute myocardial infarction. 50 For patients at high risk of acute myocardial infarction,
where the decision to hospitalize is less discretionary, hospital admission rates did not differ.' The "percentage of patients who suffered
acute myocardial infarction and who were inadvertently discharged
from the emergency department" also was the same for HMO patients and other patients.'
In their study, the authors acknowledged that salaried HMO primary physicians, "although at minimal direct financial risk, certainly
would not receive financial rewards for hospitalizing their patients."' 53 They noted that their explanations were uncertain for why
they had found "unexpectedly higher ' 1 5 4 admission rates for HMO
patients with chest pain.' They contend the unexpected results suggested that "[o]rganizational factors beyond financial incentives ...
may exercise a more powerful influence on physicians' decision making, potentially leading to increased hospitalization of HMO pa6
tients." 5
F.

Efficiency in Medical Treatment

A driving force in health care today is elimination of waste while
maintaining quality. Research indicates that HMOs are highly effective in achieving this goal. The Journalof the American Medical As-

sociation published a comprehensive review of studies conducted since
1980 comparing managed care with indemnity plans; it found that, in
eighteen of twenty comparisons from nine different studies, HMO
plans used 22% fewer procedures, tests, or treatments that were considered expensive and/or had cheaper alternatives.5 7 At the same
time, sixteen studies conducted since 1980 have shown either better or
equivalent quality-of-care results for HMO patients compared to feefor-service patients. These studies reviewed a broad range of medical
conditions, diseases, or interventions, including congestive heart failure, colorectal cancer, diabetes, hypertension, colon cancer, and cerebrovascular accident.5 8
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 64-66.
Id.
Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id. at 71.
Miller & Luft, supra note 101, at 1515.
Id. at 1516.
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One such study compared clogged artery treatment decisions for
Medicaid patients, patients covered by fee-for-service plans, and patients enrolled in HMOs. This 1988 study found that fee-for-service
patients were approximately 2.3 times more likely than HMO patients
to undergo coronary bypass surgery or angioplasty than Medicaid patients, while HMO patients were only about 1.5 times more likely to
undergo coronary bypass surgery or angioplasty than Medicaid patients.15 9 However, mortality rates for HMO patients were slightly
lower than those of fee-for-service patients; the lower mortality rates
suggest that some of the coronary bypass surgery may have been unnecessary, which may have increased patient mortality. 60 The authors
noted that the rate at which discretionary procedures were performed
on HMO enrollees was lower than that on patients with fee-for-service
coverage and suggested that this indicated "a more appropriate use of
16
procedures in HMOs."
At least one other study appears to indicate that HMOs provide
more effective and efficient care. This study, comparing the treatment
and mortality risk of prostate cancer patients covered by fee-for-service plans to such patients enrolled in HMOs, found that the HMO
patients were less likely to receive surgery, but more likely to receive
radiation therapy, than patients in fee-for-service settings. 62 Mortality
risk was also lower for the HMO patients than for the fee-for-service
patients, especially in low-income patients.6 3 The authors stated that
the finding of less frequent surgery, but more frequent radiation therapy, was consistent with previous findings that HMOs favor outpatient care. 64 However, the authors stated that the results of their
study "contradict the belief that HMOs undertreat their patients" and
"should encourage policy makers to continue viewing the HMO as a
desirable alternative to traditional fee-for-service plans, particularly
for low-income persons." 6
G.

Survival and Mortality Rates

The ultimate indicators of the quality of health care coverage are
survival and mortality rates. Again, research suggests that survival
and mortality rates for HMO patients are at least equal to, if not
159. Kenneth M. Langa & Elliot J. Sussman, The Effect of Cost-ContainmentPolicies on
Rates of Coronary Revascularization in California, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1784, 1787 (1993).
160. Id. at 1788.
161. Id.at 1789.
162. Greenwald & Henke, supra note 122, at 1100.
163. Id. at 1102.
164. Id. at 1103.
165. Id.
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better than, the rates for fee-for-service patients. Coverage of preventive services, such as cancer screening, appears to have a positive effect on the stage at which cancer is diagnosed; early detection is
"strongly associated" with survival and mortality rates.' 66 Furthermore, a study comparing the treatment and survival of prostate cancer
patients in HMO and fee-for-service settings found that the mortality
risk was lower for HMO patients than for patients with fee-for-service
plans, with the difference being greatest among patients with low incomes. 67 The authors noted other research indicating that treatment
in an HMO setting also may increase survival rates for low-income
patients with other cancers. 6 From their own research and available
literature, the authors concluded that HMOs "enable persons predisposed to seeking appropriate care to do so," and that HMOs "promote access to basic medical services"; these factors "appear
69
conducive to survival."'
A year-long study comparing the health status outcomes of elderly
Medicaid recipients enrolled in fee-for-service plans to those enrolled
in prepaid plans also documented equally favorable survival rates for
managed care enrollees.170 In a study of 800 Medicaid beneficiaries
aged 65 or older, there was no difference in the number of deaths
between those enrolled in fee-for-service plans and those who received
prepaid care.' 7
IV.

CONCLUSION

Proponents of anti-managed care legislation argue that the quality
of care HMOs provide is, or will be, poorer than the quality of care
provided in the traditional fee-for-service settings. However, as shown
by the research cited in this Article, the quality of care in an HMO
setting is often equal to or better than that provided in a traditional
fee-for-service setting. Additionally, HMOs provide this equivalent or
superior medical care at a lower cost.
Managed care plans tend to offer better access to screening and preventive care services. Thus, they are better at keeping their enrollees
healthy, and their physicians are often able to diagnose conditions at
an earlier, more manageable stage. For these and other reasons, managed care plans can be more efficient and effective than fee-for-service

166.
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168.
169.
170.
171.

Riley et al., supranote 114, at 1602-03.
Greenwald & Henke, supra note 122, at 1102.
Id. at 1103-04.
Id. at 1104.
Lurie et al., supra note 123, at 506.
Id.

1995]

ANTI-MANA GED CARE LEGISLA TION

511

plans. The studies clearly indicate that HMOs are a viable means for
providing low-cost, quality health care.
This review of the objective medical literature indicates that there is
no legitimate reason to eliminate HMOs as a health care alternative.
Studies demonstrate that increased enrollment in managed care plans
is beginning to slow the runaway increases in health care costs. However, physicians and others have proposed, and continue to propose,
legislation that strikes at the foundation of HMOs and managed care
plans. The authors believe the proponents of such legislation are either not aware of these objective studies or may have been unduly
swayed by anecdotal evidence of abuse. After an analysis of proposed
anti-managed care legislation and a thorough review of the available
literature, the authors conclude that legislation which seeks to eliminate the very concepts on which managed care is based is unnecessary
and will deprive Florida citizens of their ability to choose this option
for high-quality, low-cost health care.

